The Sports Bloviators (aka, TV and radio sports talk folks) are unanimous in their condemnation of Denver’s end-game on Monday night, calling it “indefensible,” “idiotic,” “worst decision ever,” etc. I beg to differ . . . at least in degree.
Would I have let Russ try to get the first down on 4th and 5, and if successful, enhanced the chances of a winning FG? Yeah, probably. But I don’t view the coach’s decision to go for the FG – after letting the clock run down and only using a timeout to avoid delay-of-game – as indefensible. At all.
Look, the calculus seems pretty straightforward to me – which do you think is more likely: (a) making a 64 yard FG, or (b) converting 4th and 5 and then making a FG of 58 yards or less (depending on how subsequent downs after conversion went). I don’t know what analytics say there, but I think the percentages have to be pretty close.
You start, obviously, with whether or not you THINK the kicker can make a FG of that distance. Obviously, the coach thought the answer was “Yes” (and the kick itself had the distance and only leaked a bit left). So I think that was a reasonable starting point. You then weight it against (a) making fourth and five, (b) making a shorter FG of indeterminate length, and (c) the risk of something NOT going terribly wrong on subsequent pre-FG-attempt plays.
As noted, I probably opt for the latter scenario, but it’s not crazy to opt for the first. And once you do that, you DEFINITELY let the clock burn all the way down to limit the time Seattle has to try its own GW FG, assuming Denver hits the long one.
The notion that he should have used a timeout (as Peyton was evidently screaming on his simulcast commentary) only applies if you’re pursuing Option B. Having timeouts AFTER any FG attempt is pretty academic. I mean, Denver could have burned a TO on fourth down and gone for it. If they failed to convert, there is a minute 10 left, and they have 2 timeouts, and SEA has the ball near mid-field. They can run the clock out (or awfully close to it), rendering another chance at getting the ball pretty illusory.
Bottom line: I “get” that sports talk hosts need to find content and that attacking coaches is much more palatable (for a variety of reasons) than attacking players. But really, the criticism of this decision was WAY over the top. Indeed, if the kicker had made the FG – and it was very, very close (had the distance) – then would the coach be hailed as a genius with balls the size of church bells? [In that scenario, SEA would have had 20 seconds - as opposed to a minute-plus - to get into FG range, had DEN used a timeout immediately on fourth down and made the same decision to kick the FG].
Would I have let Russ try to get the first down on 4th and 5, and if successful, enhanced the chances of a winning FG? Yeah, probably. But I don’t view the coach’s decision to go for the FG – after letting the clock run down and only using a timeout to avoid delay-of-game – as indefensible. At all.
Look, the calculus seems pretty straightforward to me – which do you think is more likely: (a) making a 64 yard FG, or (b) converting 4th and 5 and then making a FG of 58 yards or less (depending on how subsequent downs after conversion went). I don’t know what analytics say there, but I think the percentages have to be pretty close.
You start, obviously, with whether or not you THINK the kicker can make a FG of that distance. Obviously, the coach thought the answer was “Yes” (and the kick itself had the distance and only leaked a bit left). So I think that was a reasonable starting point. You then weight it against (a) making fourth and five, (b) making a shorter FG of indeterminate length, and (c) the risk of something NOT going terribly wrong on subsequent pre-FG-attempt plays.
As noted, I probably opt for the latter scenario, but it’s not crazy to opt for the first. And once you do that, you DEFINITELY let the clock burn all the way down to limit the time Seattle has to try its own GW FG, assuming Denver hits the long one.
The notion that he should have used a timeout (as Peyton was evidently screaming on his simulcast commentary) only applies if you’re pursuing Option B. Having timeouts AFTER any FG attempt is pretty academic. I mean, Denver could have burned a TO on fourth down and gone for it. If they failed to convert, there is a minute 10 left, and they have 2 timeouts, and SEA has the ball near mid-field. They can run the clock out (or awfully close to it), rendering another chance at getting the ball pretty illusory.
Bottom line: I “get” that sports talk hosts need to find content and that attacking coaches is much more palatable (for a variety of reasons) than attacking players. But really, the criticism of this decision was WAY over the top. Indeed, if the kicker had made the FG – and it was very, very close (had the distance) – then would the coach be hailed as a genius with balls the size of church bells? [In that scenario, SEA would have had 20 seconds - as opposed to a minute-plus - to get into FG range, had DEN used a timeout immediately on fourth down and made the same decision to kick the FG].
